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21. Introduction
Mobile (or cellular) communications markets have been growing at an impressive rate 
over the last two decades, with worldwide subscriptions increasing from a few million in the 
90s to seven billion users in 2013 on all continents.
4
 Competition in the industry has been
quite vigorous, and regulators have not interfered much with the workings of the market. In 
particular, and contrary to fixed telephony networks, retail prices directly set by regulators 
are virtually unknown in mobile telephony. 
This view is possibly too simplistic, as regulators have also dealt extensively with 
matters related to mobile telephony, but in a way which is less visible to end users. An 
important question is whether the design of regulation of the early days is still valid in the 
light of the dynamic development of this industry.
5
Regulators in particular worry about inter-network (termination) charges for calls to 
mobile networks, and starting in the early 2000s have repeatedly intervened over the years to 
cut these charges with the aim to improve competition and reduce prices to final consumers. 
However, both academics and mobile operators have argued that reducing the level of mobile 
termination rates can potentially increase, instead of decrease, the level of prices for mobile 
subscribers, causing what it was termed as the “waterbed” effect. In our earlier work 
(Genakos and Valletti, 2011), using data for the period 2002-2006, we showed that, indeed, 
countries that introduced regulation that cut the termination rates caused a significant 
waterbed effect, whereby a ten percent reduction in mobile termination rates led to a 5% 
increase in mobile retail prices, varying between 2%-15% depending on the estimate. In other 
words, cuts in termination rates before 2006 had led to the possibly adverse consequence of 
increasing the yearly bill per mobile subscriber by roughly 25 euros (varying from 10 to 82 
euros), or some 750 million euros (varying from 300 to 2,400 million) extra in total in our 
sample. 
The introduction of the New Regulatory Framework for electronic communications by 
the European Commission in 2002, where mobile termination was defined as a relevant 
market, meant that over time all EU countries imposed various differential cuts to termination 
4
 World Telecommunication/ICT Indicator Database, International Telecommunications Union, 2013. 
5
 An issue that we do not consider here are barriers to entry, which are mainly due to a limited number of 
licenses granted by national authorities, reflecting a scarcity in the spectrum of electromagnetic frequencies that 
are needed to operate a mobile telephony network. This physical restriction has been overcome to some extent 
in recent years due to the creation of “mobile virtual network operators” (MVNOs), which are independent firms 
who do not own a physical network but rather rent airtime on existing ones. 
3rates. The debate among regulators and mobile operators on the likely benefits and costs of 
termination rate regulation became even more intense, with our work being featured as a 
“weapon” against any tightening of such regulation.
6
 At the same time though, the
telecommunications market was undergoing a fundamental change, whereby mobile voice 
traffic had overcome fixed line call volumes, changing the economic forces that gave rise to 
the waterbed effect in the previous years.  
In this paper we summarize these new theoretical arguments related to the underlying 
changes in mobile-to-mobile and fixed-to-mobile traffic volumes, and we empirically re-visit 
our earlier analysis, using an extended dataset covering 27 countries from 2002 until the end 
of 2011. Our new results demonstrate that the waterbed effect is not present anymore on 
average across the whole sample. Delving deeper into the possible channels, we uncover, in 
line with theory, that the distinguishing feature for this change is the importance of calls 
made from and to mobile phones relative to calls made to mobile phones from fixed lines. 
The ratio of mobile to fixed traffic is key in our findings. Countries that introduced 
termination rate regulation when mobile traffic was high did not experience any waterbed 
effect. On the contrary, countries that introduced the same regulation at a time of low mobile 
traffic experienced the waterbed effect overall: retail prices first increased substantially, as 
we found in Genakos and Valletti (2011), but then this effect considerably decreased over 
time due to the growing importance of mobile-to-mobile traffic. Finally, we do not find any 
evidence that profits of mobile operators have been affected by regulatory cuts in termination 
rates. 
Our results have important policy consequences. The fact that mobile penetration 
nowadays is very high in most developed countries, and that mobile-to-mobile traffic far 
exceeds fixed-to-mobile traffic volumes, means that regulators should now be less worried 
about possible adverse or unintended short-run consequences of regulatory cuts to mobile 
termination charges. The absence of the waterbed effect now implies that further termination 
charges cuts will decrease the price of calls to mobile phones, which will benefit consumers. 
Nor there is any strong indication that these cuts have considerably weakened the mobile 
operators’ position to survive or to compete by making new investments.  
6
 When responding to the European Commission’s 2008 Recommendation on further cuts to mobile termination 
rates, Vodafone, the largest mobile operator in Europe, explicitly mentioned our work on the waterbed effect 
(available, at the time, in a draft form) and went as far as to argue that such further cuts would result in a 
decrease in mobile ownership within the EU-27 by almost 40 million users. See http://ec.europa.eu/ 
information_society/policy/ecomm/doc/termination_rates/library/public_consult/termination_rates/vodafone.pdf
4The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, we describe the main issues 
related to mobile interconnection. In particular, we highlight how results from the extant 
literature differ when calls are made from fixed to mobile networks, as opposed to calls 
within the mobile industry. Section 3 presents the empirical framework, while Section 4 
describes our data. Section 5 discusses the empirical results, split between the effects that 
regulation had on customers’ bills and on mobile operators’ profits. Section 6 concludes. 
2. Interconnection and call termination
Telecommunications networks sell wholesale services (also called “termination”) to each 
other, as a call which is initiated on a network must obviously also be answered, and not 
necessarily on the same network. These termination services are not directly visible to end 
users, but have an impact on their bills. 
In the early days of mobile telephony, the largest amount of traffic directed to mobile 
phones would come from fixed networks. The economics literature highlighted how, even in 
settings where mobile operators compete against each other vigorously, competition does not 
help to keep fixed-to-mobile (F2M) termination rates low.
7
 This situation has been called one
of “competitive bottlenecks”: Mobile operators have the ability and incentives to set 
monopoly prices in the market for F2M calls (as the price there is paid by callers on the fixed 
line, not by own mobile customers), but the rents thus obtained might be exhausted via 
cheaper prices to mobile customers in case competition among mobile operators is vigorous. 
The intuition for the monopoly pricing result for the F2M market is simple: Imagine 
F2M termination rates were set at cost; then one mobile operator, by raising its F2M 
termination rate, would be able to generate additional profits that it could use to lower 
subscription charges and attract more customers. While the mobile sector would therefore not 
necessarily be making any excess profits overall, an inefficiently low number of F2M calls 
would be made.  
Given the strong case for regulatory intervention, it is not surprising that many countries 
have decided to intervene to cut these rates. Indeed, all EU member states, as well as several 
other countries, have done so, to the benefit of consumers calling mobile phones. The 
7
 See Gans and King (2000), Armstrong (2002), and Wright (2002). 
5“market analysis” performed under the European Regulatory Framework for 
Communications adheres to this logic: Each mobile network is a monopolist on termination 
of calls to its own customers and therefore has the market power to raise wholesale prices 
significantly above cost.  
By cutting termination rates, regulators have benefited those fixed users calling mobile 
phones from the fixed networks. However, reducing the level of F2M termination rates can 
potentially increase the level of prices for mobile subscribers, causing what is known as the 
“waterbed” (or “seesaw”) effect. The negative relationship between F2M termination rates 
and prices paid by mobile consumers is a rather strong theoretical prediction that holds under 
many assumptions about the details of competition among mobile operators.
8
These predictions, though, are only valid for F2M calls. Over the last decade most 
countries have witnessed a strong growth of the mobile sector that has now overtaken fixed 
telephony. Given these developments it is worth asking if the economics of mobile-to-mobile 
(M2M) calls are the same, and whether the rationale for intervention has changed or not. 
The economics literature has analysed those issues in detail. To make the analysis 
sharper, a large part of the literature on competition between mobile networks is concerned 
primarily with their interconnection and the setting of the corresponding wholesale prices, 
therefore ignoring calls received from the fixed network, which were instead the focus of the 
earlier studies. The seminal works of Armstrong (1998), and Laffont et al. (1998) considered 
the question of whether mobile networks could achieve collusive outcomes in the retail 
market by jointly choosing the M2M termination rate. This research question should be seen 
in the light of the broader issue of whether competition between firms owning 
communications infrastructures should involve only minimal regulation, such as an 
obligation to give access and negotiate over the respective charges, or whether wholesale 
prices should be regulated directly. A concern is that wholesale rates might be set in such a 
way as to relax competition in the retail market, i.e., that termination rates could be used as 
an instrument of “tacit” collusion. 
What the more recent literature found is that the answer depends on several nuances of 
the models employed. A reduction in M2M termination causes directly a reduction in the 
costs for all calls made to customers belonging to a different mobile network (the so-called 
8
 See Armstrong (2002), Wright (2002), and Genakos and Valletti (2011). 
6“off-net” calls). But there are also subtle strategic effects, often depending on the types of 
tariffs used: With linear tariffs, i.e., tariffs that only charge for each call made, networks 
would coordinate on termination rates above cost in order to raise the cost of stealing each 
other’s clients. In this case, lowering M2M termination rates would actually make the 
industry more competitive, therefore reducing bills. In this scenario, one would expect a 
positive relationship between termination rates and customers’ bills. This is in stark contrast 
with the unambiguous waterbed effect that would arise from F2M calls. 
Hence, the economics of F2M termination are quite different from the economics of 
M2M termination. But, in practice, the two are related. A relation arises in two ways: Either 
both M2M and F2M termination rates are forced by regulation to be set at the same level, or 
“arbitrage” possibilities force them to be so, as discussed in Armstrong and Wright (2009).  
This has important consequences for the way customers’ bills would change as a 
consequence of regulations that cuts termination rates. In the Appendix, we present a simple 
Hotelling model of duopoly competition in the mobile industry, alongside calls being 
received from the fixed network, and show that the total bill of a mobile customer can be 
summarised as follows: 
(1) Bill = cost + Hotelling parameter – “rent from F2M calls” + “effect of M2M 
competition”. 
The first term on the RHS refers to the total cost of supplying mobile telephony services 
to a user. The second term is a standard term reflecting the intensity of (horizontal) 
competition between networks. The third and fourth terms are what we discussed above, and 
they both depend on termination rates. The lower the termination rate, the lower the 
termination rent from F2M calls, therefore causing a waterbed effect: The bill should 
increase as a consequence of a regulatory cut in termination rates. However, this very same 
cut will also impact on the last term. While in general its sign depends on model details, it 
suffices here to say that there are plausible circumstances that make the last effect opposite to 
the waterbed prediction. An example was given above (competition in linear tariffs), but 
there are several other mechanisms that generate the same predictions.
9
 Since regulation
9
 An expression akin to eq. (1) can be found, e.g., in the model of Armstrong and Wright (2009) that we take as 
a reference point (see their eq. (12)). Other models that would generate a similar prediction on bills include 
those of Hoernig et al. (2014) who model calling circles, Hurkens and Lopez (2014) who consider customers’ 
expectations, and Jullien et al. (2013), who deal with heterogeneous mobile calling patterns. For surveys on the 
existing literature, see Armstrong (2002), Gans et al. (2005), and Hoernig and Valletti (2012). 
7affects both the last two terms, our aim is to try to capture the overall effect on the total bill 
coming from regulatory cuts in mobile termination rates. 
3. Empirical Framework
For our empirical analysis, we employ an instrumental variable regression framework, 
similar to our earlier research (Genakos and Valletti, 2011): 
(2) lnPujct = αujc + αt + β1ln(MTR)jct + εujct, 
(3) lnΠjct = αjc + αt + β1ln(MTR)jct + εjct. 
Eq. (2) tests the impact of regulation of mobile termination rates (MTR) on customers’ 
bills, while eq. (3) tests the impact regulation has on mobile operators’ profits. More in detail, 
the dependent variable in eq. (2) is the logarithm of (euros PPP adjusted) retail prices (lnPujct) 
paid by a customer with the usage profile u = {low, medium, high} and subscribing to mobile 
operator j in country c in quarter t. The dependent variable in eq. (3) is the logarithm of 
earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA), which is defined as 
the sum of operating income and depreciation and is our proxy for profits (lnΠjct). Time fixed 
effects (αt) and usage-operator-country fixed effects (αujc) control for time-invariant global 
trends and for usage-operator-country characteristics, respectively. The main variable of 
interest, ln(MTR)jct, is the logarithm of the (euros PPP adjusted) mobile termination rates 
charged by mobile operators for terminating calls on their networks. 
The key idea is to use termination rate regulation as an instrument that directly impacts 
only MTRs and not customers’ bills. In our earlier work (Genakos and Valletti, 2011) we 
argue extensively on the exogeneity of regulation with respect to mobile bills (pp. 10-14). We 
recall here the important point that regulators do not have any legal power to intervene on 
retail prices in the mobile industry, and conduct a wholesale market analysis of mobile call 
termination only. Hence, both retail prices and termination rates were freely chosen by 
mobile operators before the introduction of regulation and should be considered endogenous. 
After the introduction of regulation though, MTRs were capped by regulators through glide 
paths that were always binding for mobile operators. In other words, after regulation is 
applied, the MTR becomes exogenous as it is set by the regulators and not the mobile 
operators themselves. 
8As an example, consider the MTRs set by the telecommunications regulator in France 
(ARCEP).
10
 Regulation was introduced in 2004, where mobile termination to the two largest
firms (Orange and SFR) was capped at 14.94 €cent/min, while the latest entrant in the market 
(Bouygues) was capped at 17.89 €cent/min. All operators indeed set their termination rates at 
the maximum level allowed by the cap. In every year since then, the regulator has further cut 
MTRs, allowing some differentiation between the largest incumbents and the smallest 
entrant, until 2011Q3 when all operators’ MTRs were capped at the same rate of 2 €cent/min. 
This is a huge change in just seven years, showing an example of how the binding glide paths 
set by the regulators have been decreasing fast over time. We exploit both differences in the 
timing of the enactment, but also differences in the toughness of the implementation of the 
regulation across and within countries.
11
 First, we use a binary indicator (0/1) to signify the
exact timing of the start of regulation for every operator in each country (Regulationjct). The 
impact of regulation on prices through the MTR is identified from countries that introduced 
the regulation and measures the effect of regulation in reforming countries compared to the 
general evolution of prices in non-reforming countries. This simple indicator is very powerful 
when examining the years around the change in regulation. However, its identification power 
deteriorates towards the end of our dataset when all the countries have introduced such 
regulation. For instance, in the French case illustrated above, a binary variable equal to one 
over the seven-year period 2004-2011 would not be able to capture the actual toughness of 
regulation at the intensive margin. Using the binary indicator is not enough because prices do 
not simply respond to the initial step decrease in MTRs, but also to a continuous and fast 
sliding path. To capture this underlying phenomenon, we also employ an index of regulation 
that varies over time depending not only when each country introduced this regulation, but 
also how “tough” the regulatory authorities were in cutting MTRs. Our index of regulation is 
defined as: 
(4) 





−=
regulated, is  if 
d,unregulate is  if 0
index 
jct
jct
jctc
jct
jct
MTR
MTR
MTRMaxMTR
MTR
MTRMaxCountry
where cMaxMTR  is the highest MTR allowed in country c one quarter before the 
introduction of regulation, capturing the level that MTRs would achieve in the absence of 
10
 http://www.arcep.fr/index.php?id=8080 
11
 On the rationale as to why regulation varies across operators within a country, see Dewenter and Haucap 
(2005). 
9regulatory interventions. The absolute level of the index is not of particular concern when 
comparing countries, as we control for time-invariant country-operator-usage fixed effects, as 
well as time fixed effects that account for common global trends.  
4. Data
We matched three different data sources for our analysis. First, we used Cullen 
International to get information on mobile termination rates. Using this source and various 
other industry and regulatory publications, we were also in a position to identify the dates in 
which regulation was introduced across countries and operators, and the level of regulated 
rates (see, Table 1). Second, we used Teligen to obtain quarterly information on the total bills 
paid by consumers across operators and countries (2002Q3-2011Q4). Teligen collects and 
compares all available tariffs of the two largest mobile operators for thirty OECD countries. 
It constructs three different consumer usage profiles (large, medium and low) based on the 
number of calls and messages, the average call length and the time and type of call.
12
 A
distinction between pre-paid (pay-as-you-go) and post-paid (contract) tariffs is also accounted 
for, as this is an important industry characteristic. These consumer profiles are then held fixed 
when looking across countries and time. Third, we used quarterly information taken from the 
Global Wireless Matrix of the Bank of America Merrill Lynch dataset (henceforth, BoAML). 
BoAML compiles basic operating metrics for mobile operators in forty-six countries. For our 
purposes, we used the reported earnings margin before interest, taxes, depreciation and 
amortization (EBITDA).
13
 Table 2 provides some key summary statistics.
The Teligen dataset has two main advantages. First, by fixing a priori the calling profiles 
of customers, it provides us with information on the best choices of these customers across 
countries and time. Second, the prices reported in this dataset include much of the relevant 
information for this industry, such as inclusive minutes, quantity discounts, discounts to 
special numbers, etc. (although it does not include handset subsidies). However, this richness 
of information comes at the cost of having data for only the two biggest operators of every 
country at each point in time. This reduces the variability and makes identification of our 
12
 Note that these are hypothetical profiles and not actual customer bills. 
13
 All consumer prices, termination rates and revenue data were converted to euros using the Purchasing Power 
Parities (PPP) currency conversions published by the OECD to ease comparability. None of our results depends 
on this transformation. 
10
variables of interest harder.
14
 Moreover, examining a decade long of consumer behaviour in
such a dynamic industry such as the telecommunication industry, would perhaps call into 
question the stability of the customer profiles throughout the whole period. Indeed, Teligen 
adjusted the calling profiles of its customers in 2006 and we will also use this dataset to 
examine the robustness of our results. 
5. Results
Results from our baseline model (2) are reported in Table 3. In column (1) we replicate 
our earlier results: For the period 2002Q3-2006Q1, we found a statistically significant 
waterbed effect when employing the binary indicator for regulation.
15
 Column (2) applies the
same approach to the whole sample (2002Q3-2011Q4). The picture now changes quite 
dramatically, despite a trebling of the sample size. The waterbed effect is now statistically 
indistinguishable from zero. Most importantly though, the binary indicator of regulation does 
not seem to be a valid instrument in the first stage. This is somehow expected since, as 
argued above, the identification power of the binary indicator diminishes over time as all the 
countries become regulated and underestimates the tightening of regulatory cuts over time. 
For this reason, in the next two columns we employ the MaxCountry index of regulation. In 
column (3), looking at the period 2002-2006, there is a positive and significant waterbed 
effect, in line with our earlier results, thus reassuring on the validity of the MaxCountry index 
of regulation. The effect becomes insignificant when looking at the whole sample in column 
(4). Notice that the first-stage coefficient is in both cases negative and significant, capturing 
the continuous tightening of the regulation. We conclude that a decade of regulation has cut 
termination rates, but did not have any adverse impact on mobile bills to final customers on 
the whole.
16
14
 The BoAML dataset, which gathers information from companies’ accounts, includes instead every mobile 
operator in a country. 
15
 See, Genakos and Valletti (2011), Table 1, column 1. 
16
 Also notice that the Pre-paid dummy always gets a negative sign, statistically significant in columns (3) and 
(4), reflecting that pre-paid bills are lower than post-paid bills. 
11
In Table 4 we conduct several robustness checks.
17
 First, Teligen updated in 2006 the way
it calculates baskets of services. In particular, from 2006Q2, Teligen reports information both 
about a “new” basket that it found more relevant for market comparisons, as well as the “old” 
basket employed in earlier periods. Hence, in the second half of our data (2006Q2-2011Q4), 
we can see if differences might arise by employing different weights in the customers’ 
profiles. The answer is no: Results persist in both cases; see columns (1) and (2). Employing 
both the “old” and the “new” Teligen baskets produces very comparable results, whereby the 
first stage coefficient is negative and significant, but the second stage impact on MTRs is 
statistically not different from zero. 
Second, in the expanded dataset, new countries not previously monitored are included. 
These correspond to Estonia, Finland and Slovenia (about 200 observations in total). To 
check if results are driven by a composition effect, we exclude these countries. Results in 
column (3) are virtually identical to those in Table 3, column (4). Hence, the vanishing of the 
waterbed effect does not seem to be driven by having included a particular set of countries. 
As a third exercise, we consider the extent to which results are driven by the treatment 
group. In Genakos and Valletti (2011), we had a set of countries that were always regulated, a 
set that were always unregulated, and a set of countries that experienced a change of 
regulation during the period. The latter set of countries is the treatment group in our earlier 
work.
18
 In the new dataset, all countries get regulated – sooner or later. In column (4), we
compare the set of countries that got regulated post-2006 (“new treatment group”)
19
 with the
control group that was always regulated throughout the period – hence excluding the 
treatment group of Genakos and Valletti (2011). Results indicate that the waterbed effect is 
not present for this set of countries. Finally, in column (5) we compare the evolution of prices 
in countries that introduced the MTR regulation before 2006 (“old treatment group”) to the 
evolution of prices in countries that were regulated, hence excluding the countries that were 
unregulated until 2006. Results seem to indicate that the waterbed effect is still present for 
this set of countries, even though it has been reduced significantly over time.
20
 Hence, there
seems to be a distinctive behaviour between countries that introduce termination rate 
17
 We also considered an alternative index of regulation instead of the MaxCountry index. We constructed an 
index called MaxAll, similar to eq. (4), but where we replace the MaxMTRc in the numerator of the RHS with 
the highest MTR among all countries at a given period t. This index has more time variation. Results are 
reported in Table A1 and remain qualitatively the same (see supplementary material). 
18
 The set comprises Australia, France, Germany, Portugal and Switzerland. 
19
 The set comprises Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand and Turkey. 
20
 The second stage coefficient in Table 4, column (5) is less than half that of Table 3, column (3).
12
regulation earlier to the countries that did that later on. In line with the theoretical arguments 
presented above, our conjecture is that this difference is not random, but stems from the 
increasing importance of M2M relative to F2M calls. We explore this hypothesis below. 
4.1 Industry evolution 
The picture in the telephony market that emerges in recent years is very different from 
the one in early years, where we had found in our previous work the existence of a waterbed 
effect. The evolution of the UK market provides an interesting case study. According to 
Ofcom, the UK’s regulator, in 2005 the volume of F2M calls was 15.7 bn minutes, 
comparable with 16 bn minutes of M2M off-net calls. By 2012, F2M calls were 9.4 bn 
minutes, less than one fourth of the 43 bn minutes of M2M off-net calls.
21
 From these figures,
it is also immediately apparent how relevant the stakes are: A cut in termination rates of 1 
penny per minute, when multiplied by several billions of minutes of communications every 
year, produces large transfers of money in the industry. Therefore, according to the 
theoretical predictions summarised by eq. (1), what should matter for the overall effect of 
regulation of termination rates on mobile customers’ bills, is the relative weight that F2M 
calls have compared to M2M calls. The larger the share of M2M calls, the lower the waterbed 
effect that could even change sign. 
To investigate this we collected additional information on traffic patterns in the telephony 
industry to see how these changed over time. First, we collected annual information on the 
ratio of mobile to total outgoing voice traffic
22
 from the Body of European Regulators for
Electronic Communications (BEREC) and the reports published by the EU Electronic 
Communications Market indicators. Using this information, Figure 1 looks at mobile traffic 
as a percentage of the total outgoing traffic and reports the change in this percentage between 
2005 and 2010 for almost all the countries in our sample.
23
 The UK example is by no means
an outlier: The average increase of the mobile traffic percentage was 63% across all 
countries, indicating the strong trend from fixed to mobile usage. In addition, we also 
21
 See “Communications Market Report: UK”, Ofcom 2013. 
22
 This is defined as (M2F + M2M)/(F2M + M2M + M2F + F2F) where each term is expressed in minutes. 
23
 For Luxembourg and New Zealand we could only find information for 2008 and 2009, so we do not report 
them in the graph. 
13
collected similar information on the ratio of mobile (M2F + M2M) to total (F2M + M2M + 
M2F) outgoing voice traffic
24
 on a quarterly basis from the market research company
Analysys Mason Ltd. We also looked at other measures (e.g., the percentage of mobile 
subscribers of the whole telephony industry), and at other periods. They are not reported here 
for the sake of brevity, but they all show an unmistakable pattern: Fixed telephony has been 
declining over time in its importance compared to mobile telephony as far as voice and text 
communications are concerned.
25
 As a consequence, the waterbed effect should have been
overtaken by competitive effects within the mobile industry. 
Using these new datasets, we calculated the ratio of mobile to total traffic at the time of the 
introduction of MTR regulation across all countries. We then split the sample into those 
countries with above and below median mobile to total traffic ratio, and compare the 
evolution of prices in those countries using as a control the countries that were always 
regulated. Table 5 reports the results. Using the BEREC/EU information we find a positive 
and significant waterbed effect in column (1) for those countries that introduced the MTR 
regulation when they had a below median mobile to total traffic ratio, but no waterbed effect 
in column (2) for those countries that introduce the same regulation when they had an above 
median similar ratio. Columns (3) and (4) repeat the same exercise using the Analysys Mason 
information. Again, countries with below median ratio seem to experience a positive and 
significant waterbed effect, which disappears for those with a high mobile total traffic ratio. 
Notice that in all columns the first stage effect of a cut in MTRs on prices is always negative 
and significant.  
4.2 Impact on profits 
We finally looked at the impact of regulation of termination rates on mobile operators’ 
profits. Operators often challenge, and vehemently so, regulatory cuts in court. They argue 
that regulatory cuts will reduce their profitability and, more importantly, will diminish their 
incentives to invest in the industry, e.g., via technology improvements and upgrades. The 
24
 Hence, excluding F2F voice traffic from the total traffic. The new ratio is defined as (M2F + M2M)/(F2M + 
M2M + M2F), where each term is expressed in minutes. 
25
 Fixed telephony, however, still performs other fundamental roles – in particular it provides the main 
infrastructure for broadband communications. 
operators’ behaviour is however mixed in this respect, as these views are not shared by all, 
especially as some operators have argued that, on the contrary, reduced termination rates will 
be pro-competitive since they will reduce asymmetric treatments between on-net and off-net 
calls. 
14
We do not find any statistically relevant result.
26
 MTR regulation did not seem to affect
profits either way over the entire period. We also tested if there was any differential impact of 
regulation of termination rates on the profits of “large” vs “small” operators (we defined as 
“small” any other than the two biggest operators in each country). On the one hand, smaller 
operators typically have more outgoing than incoming off-net traffic, so they might benefit 
from cuts that will reduce their net outgoing payments. On the other hand, smaller operators 
have been allowed for some time higher (asymmetric) termination rates, thus a cut in 
termination rates might be tougher for them. Again, we find no differential impact of 
regulation of termination rates on the profits of small and large operators. The effects are not 
significantly different from zero.  
On balance, we do not find evidence that profits of mobile operators have been affected by 
regulatory cuts in termination rates. Data, however, are considerably noisier than the price 
basket data, and results should therefore be taken with caution. It is in fact possible that 
regulation did have a negative effect on profits, but our data do not capture the fact that 
mobile operators have also been effective at reducing their cost base at the same time. For 
instance, policies like cell site sharing, or exploiting economies of scope between voice and 
data (migration from 2G to 3G services) occurred over the same period as MTR regulation 
became tighter. To the extent that these cost reductions applied differentially between 
markets over time, then our time dummies would not properly account for them. This issue 
requires further investigation, which largely depends on having access to better data on the 
operators’ accounts. 
6. Conclusions
We have conducted an assessment of regulation of mobile termination rates over the last 
decade (2002-2011), using a large sample of mobile operators which have been subject to 
various degrees of regulation over time. Our new results qualify in an important way our 
26
 Results are reported in Table A2 (see supplementary material). 
earlier findings (Genakos and Valletti, 2011) which were obtained using a similar approach, 
but employing a dataset valid only until 2006. 
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We have found that the waterbed effect has essentially unwound over time. While, in the 
earlier periods, regulatory cuts in termination rates also produced an increase in mobile 
customers’ bills, this does not hold on average using the more recent data. We demonstrate 
that this is due to the diminishing importance of fixed-to-mobile calls relative to mobile-to-
mobile calls. This is in line both with theoretical predictions and with actual industry trends. 
The implications of our results are strong. Earlier regulation of termination rates had to 
find the right balance between the benefits that would accrue to fixed users calling mobile 
phones and the negative impact on mobile phone users. This was quite a difficult exercise. 
We show that this trade-off only emerges if the fixed-to-mobile calls traffic is significantly 
larger than the mobile-to-mobile traffic. Since the trend in all countries is towards an increase 
in mobile-to-mobile traffic, the case for intervention is now more compelling as unintended 
consequences of regulation, such as the waterbed effect, are less likely to arise. 
Clearly, regulatory cuts cannot continue forever since rates are reaching the natural limit 
of the incremental costs.
27
 Regulation in the EU is therefore close to an end, in that it cannot
get any tighter than it currently is, though it cannot be removed as otherwise operators could 
respond by increasing termination rates again. However, the regulatory battleground is still 
very much open elsewhere – in particular in African and Latin American countries, where 
termination rates are typically much higher than in the EU. As also in these countries the 
mobile industry has surpassed fixed telephony in terms of subscribers and call volumes, our 
results suggest that competitive effects within the mobile industry should now prevail over 
the waterbed effect.  
The impact of regulation has also to account for the impact it has on firms’ profits and 
their incentives to invest. Possible short-run benefits from wholesale regulation must always 
be confronted with their long-run consequences. We found scant evidence that profits have 
been reduced by regulation. We also pointed out as a caveat that available price data are 
typically richer than information about operators’ profits. It would be very interesting to find 
27
 Currently, mobile termination rates are approaching 1 eurocent/min in the EU, down from an average of 13 
eurocents/min in 2005. Source: BEREC. A system of “bill-and-keep”, where calls are exchanged among all 
operators at a zero marginal cost, is the lowest possible MTR that can be eventually applied. 
more granular data at the firm level in order to investigate if this type of regulation actually 
induced firms to take actions that affected their network costs or the quality of their offerings.  
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Appendix 
The purpose of this section is to present a model that generates the tension between F2M and 
M2M calls, as described by eq. (1) in the main text. Our aim is to show a possibility result 
under very simple assumptions. To do so, we propose a model that builds directly on 
Armstrong and Wright (2009) and Hurkens and Lopez (2013). 
Imagine a setting with one fixed network and two competing mobile networks, denoted 
as firms 1 and 2. There is a total mass of  users on the fixed network. The two mobile firms
compete for a continuum of mobile consumers of mass  . Each firm i = 1, 2 charges
consumers a fixed fee fi and can discriminate between calls made on-net (i.e., made to 
customers belonging to the same network i) and off-net (i.e., made to customers belonging to 
the rival network j). Firm i’s marginal on-net price is denoted as pii and the off-net price is 
denoted as pij. Mobile consumers’ utility from making calls of length q is given by a concave, 
increasing and bounded utility function u(q). Call demand q(p) is defined by u’(q(p)) = p. The 
indirect utility derived from making calls at price p is v(p) = u(q(p)) – pq(p), where v’(p) = –
q(p). 
Each mobile firm is assumed to incur a marginal cost   of originating a call and a
marginal cost  of terminating a call, so the actual marginal cost of a M2M call is given by
 + . In addition, there is a fixed cost f of serving each mobile subscriber, which includes,
e.g., the subscriber’s handset and the billing costs. If calls are made off-net, the sending firm
does not incur the termination cost , but pays its rival a termination charge, denoted by a.
Instead, termination costs  are borne by the receiving firm, which gets a from the sending
firm. 
As for F2M calls, there are also the same costs  for origination and  for termination
of calls. The fixed network, again, has to pay the termination charge a instead of the 
termination costs, which are borne by the receiving network. We assume that there are q(P) 
minutes of F2M calls to each subscriber on network i (mobile customers only receive calls 
from the fixed network), where P denotes the F2M per-minute price. We also assume that P 
is given by  =  + 
. As discussed by Armstrong and Wright (2009), such pricing could
arise as a result of the regulation of the fixed network or competition between fixed 
networks.
28
28
Note that, when  =  + 
, a regulation that cuts the termination rate a obviously confers benefits to those
calling mobile phones from the fixed network. We are instead interested here to see the impact of this regulation 
on mobile customers. 
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If xi denotes mobile firm i’s market share, its total profits are given by 
(A1)  =  −  + ( −  − )() + (1 − )( −  − 
)() + (1 −
)(
 − )() + (
 − )( + 
).
The expression is made of several terms in the curly bracket. The first terms, grouped in the 
square bracket, correspond to profits from own customers who subscribe and make both a 
fraction  of on-net M2M calls and a fraction 1 −  of off-net M2M calls. The other two
terms correspond to profits from termination, respectively from M2M off-net calls and from 
F2M calls. 
To close the model, we follow Hurkens and Lopez (2013) and assume that mobile 
networks are differentiated à la Hotelling. Consumers are uniformly distributed on the 
segment [0, 1], while the two networks are located at the two ends of this segment (x1 = 0 and 
x2 = 1). We assume full participation so that each consumer subscribes to the network that 
yields the highest net utility. A consumer located at x and joining network i obtains a net 
utility given by 
 − | − |,
where t is the customary “transportation cost” which measures the degree of horizontal 
differentiation between the two networks, and  is the value to a consumer subscribing to
network i. In particular, given that consumers call each other with the same probability, the 
surplus from subscribing to network i (gross of transportation costs) equals 
 = 
() + 
() −  ,
where 
 is the expected market share of firm i. Market share of network i is thus given by
(A2)  =
 
!
+
"#$"%
!&
.
We solve for the equilibrium where firm i (and similarly, j) maximise its profits (A1) 
with respect to the multi-part tariff ,  ,  , subject to (A2), and where consumers’
expectations are self-fulfilled at equilibrium, that is, 
 = .
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The symmetric equilibrium is actually quite simple to characterise (for further details 
about existence, see Hurkens and Lopez, 2013). Because of the multi-part nature of the tariff, 
call prices are set at the “perceived” marginal costs, i.e.,  =  +  and  =  + 
. The
fixed fee is equal to  =  +  − (
 − )(
 + ). The total bill of a mobile consumer
is then 
(A3) ()** =  + () + (1 − )+, =
 +  − (
 − )(
 + ) +
-( + 	)( + 	) + ( + 
)( + 
)/
2
.
This expression shares the features of eq. (1) in the main text. The bill reflects fixed costs to 
supply the service (f), and the intensity of competition as described by the transportation cost 
(t). There are then two terms which directly depend on the termination charge a. One term 
represents the waterbed effect coming from F2M calls: If termination regulation cuts a, and 
thus reduces the rents from F2M calls, the bill will go up. This effect is bigger the larger the 
fixed network, as captured by  . Finally, the last term produces an opposite effect: The
lower a, the cheaper will be off-net M2M calls, thus reducing the customer’s bill. This effect 
prevails as the mobile network gets larger, as captured by .
Let us define 1(
) ≡ (
 − )(
 + ) and 3(
) ≡
(45647	)8(45647	)6(4569)8(4569)
!
. It 
is for sure 1′(
) > 0 and 3′(
) > 0, as long as a is set close to cost. Then (A3) becomes
(A4) ()** =  +  − 1(
) +3(
),
which forms the basis for our empirical specification. The total impact of regulation on the 
bill is  
(A4) 
=>??
=9
= −1′(
) +3′(
).
The sign varies as follows: 
=>??
=9
⋛ 0 ⟺ BC
BD
⋚ 
F
F
.	The overall waterbed effect in this
model thus depends on the ratio /. If this ratio is large, the waterbed effect is predicted
and bills will go up as a consequence of a regulation which cuts termination charges. If this 
ratio is small, the waterbed effect will vanish and can even change sign. 
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FIGURE 1: MOBILE AS A PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL OUTGOING TRAFFIC
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Notes: The figure presents information on the percentage of mobile traffic as a percentage of the total outgoing traffic in the whole telecommunications industry (fixed-to-fixed, mobile-to-fixed, fixed-
to-mobile and mobile-to-mobile traffic).
Source: Authors’ calculations based on information from European Commission (Electronic Communications Market Indicators – Digital Agenda Scoreboard), Body of European Regulators for
Electronic Communications (BEREC).
Country Year Comment
Poland 1997Q1 always regulated
UK 1998Q1 always regulated
Belgium 1999Q2 always regulated
Austria 2000Q2 always regulated
Italy 2000Q2 always regulated
Japan 2000Q2 always regulated
Spain 2000Q2 always regulated
Finland 2001Q2 always regulated
Norway 2001Q2 always regulated
Sweden 2001Q2 always regulated
Denmark 2001Q4 always regulated
Hungary 2002Q1 always regulated
Portugal 2003Q4 old treatment group
France 2004Q2 old treatment group
Estonia 2005Q2 always regulated
Slovenia 2005Q2 always regulated
Australia 2005Q2 old treatment group
Czech Republic 2005Q2 always regulated
Germany 2005Q2 old treatment group
Slovak Republic 2005Q2 always regulated
Switzerland 2005Q4 old treatment group
Ireland 2006Q2 new treatment group
Luxembourg 2006Q2 new treatment group
New Zealand 2006Q2 new treatment group
Turkey 2006Q2 new treatment group
Netherlands 2006Q3 new treatment group
Greece 2006Q4 new treatment group
TABLE 1 - REGULATION CHRONOLOGY
Notes: The table presents information on when the termination rate regulation was introduced
in a country (column "Year"), and the way these countries were treated within our sample
period using the Teligen price data (column "Comment").
Source: Authors’ calculations based on information from Cullen International, the European
Commission and Regulatory Authorities by country.
Variable Observations Mean Standard Deviation Min Max
lnPujct 5283 5.711 0.741 3.480 7.509
ln(MTR)jct 5283 2.270 0.518 0.694 3.292
Regulationjct 5283 0.867 0.340 0 1
MaxCountry MTR indexjct 5283 0.436 1.131 0 8.780
lnPujct 2922 5.652 0.770 3.480 7.391
ln(MTR)jct 2922 2.238 0.546 0.698 3.243
lnPujct 1086 5.831 0.675 4.119 7.197
ln(MTR)jct 1086 2.279 0.524 0.694 3.292
Regulationjct 1086 0.782 0.413 0 1
MaxCountry MTR indexjct 1086 1.276 1.561 0 8.780
lnPujct 1275 5.743 0.714 3.863 7.509
ln(MTR)jct 1275 2.337 0.432 0.993 3.199
Regulationjct 1275 0.635 0.482 0 1
MaxCountry MTR indexjct 1275 0.719 1.452 0 7.710
lnEBITDAjct 2260 -1.161 0.448 -4.749 -0.536
ln(MTR)jct 2260 2.273 0.529 0.693 3.454
Regulationjct 2260 0.847 0.360 0 1
MaxCountry MTR indexjct 2260 0.475 1.138 0 8.780
Bank of America Merrill Lynch dataset
TABLE 2 - SUMMARY STATISTICS
Teligen dataset
Always regulated countries
Old treatment countries
New treatment countries
Notes: The above table provides summary statistics on the key variables used in Tables 3-4 and A2 (supplementary material) based on the Teligen data
corresponding to the best deals available at every quarter, the BoAML dataset and the matched MTRs.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the Teligen, Cullen and BoAML matched datasets.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Estimation method IV IV IV IV
Dependent variable lnPujct lnPujct lnPujct lnPujct
Time Period 2002-2006 2002-2011 2002-2006 2002-2011
ln(MTR)jct -1.189*** 2.663 -0.760*** -0.083
(0.408) (4.465) (0.209) (0.112)
Pre-paidjct -0.066 -0.052 -0.056** -0.094***
(0.050) (0.077) (0.026) (0.022)
Usage-Country-Operator FE yes yes yes yes
Time FE yes yes yes yes
Instrument Regulationjct Regulationjct
MaxCountry MTR 
indexjct
MaxCountry MTR 
indexjct
1
st
 Stage Coef. -0.112*** 0.022 -0.329*** -0.138***
(0.026) (0.039) (0.025) (0.009)
1
st
 Stage R
2
0.052 0.001 0.168 0.267
1
st
 Stage F-test 18.28 0.32 179.19 235.59
[0.000] [0.575] [0.000] [0.000]
Observations 1749 5283 1749 5283
Clusters 153 195 153 195
TABLE 3 - WATERBED EFFECT THROUGH MTR
Notes: The dependent variable is the logarithm of the euros PPP adjusted total bill paid by consumers with different usage at every quarter. The
instrumental variable Regulation is a binary indicator that takes the value one in the quarters when mobile termination rates are regulated. The
instrumental variable MaxCountryMTR is an index that takes larger values the more regulated a mobile operator is compared to the MTR prior to
regulation in that country. P-values for diagnostic tests are in brackets and italics. Standard errors clustered at the country-operator-usage level are
reported in parenthesis below coefficients: *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the Teligen data corresponding to the best deals available at every quarter.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Estimation method IV IV IV IV IV
Dependent variable lnPujct lnPujct lnPujct lnPujct lnPujct
Time period 2006-2011 2006-2011 2002-2011 2002-2011 2002-2011
old basket new basket
excluding Estonia, 
Finland and Slovenia
new treatment group old treatment group
ln(MTR)jct 0.005 0.079 -0.087 0.096 -0.319***
(0.116) (0.135) (0.113) (0.181) (0.105)
Pre-paidjct -0.097*** -0.053** -0.093*** -0.083*** -0.079***
(0.028) (0.026) (0.022) (0.027) (0.024)
Usage-Country-Operator FE yes yes yes yes yes
Time FE yes yes yes yes yes
Instrument
MaxCountry MTR 
indexjct
MaxCountry MTR 
indexjct
MaxCountry MTR 
indexjct
MaxCountry MTR 
indexjct
MaxCountry MTR 
indexjct
1
st
 Stage Coef. -0.129*** -0.072*** -0.139*** -0.134*** -0.118***
(0.009) (0.023) (0.009) (0.010) (0.011)
1
st
 Stage R
2
0.293 0.038 0.272 0.174 0.162
1
st
 Stage F-test 190.58 9.77 225.5 196.45 126.5
[0.000] [0.002] [0.000] [0.000] [0.007]
Observations 3534 3534 5085 4197 4008
Clusters 186 186 177 159 153
TABLE 4 - WATERBED EFFECT THROUGH MTR - ROBUSTNESS
Notes: The dependent variable is the logarithm of the euros PPP adjusted total bill paid by consumers with different usage at every quarter. The instrumental variable Regulation is a
binary indicator that takes the value one in the quarters when mobile termination rates are regulated. The instrumental variable MaxCountryMTR is an index that takes larger values the
more regulated a mobile operator is compared to the MTR prior to regulation in that country. P-values for diagnostic tests are in brackets and italics. Standard errors clustered at the
country-operator-usage level are reported in parenthesis below coefficients: *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the Teligen data corresponding to the best deals available at every quarter.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Estimation method IV IV IV IV
Dependent variable lnPujct lnPujct lnPujct lnPujct
Time period 2002-2011 2002-2011 2002-2011 2002-2011
Mobile relative to total traffic Low High Low High
ln(MTR)jct -0.321*** 0.099 -0.285** -0.031
(0.104) (0.183) (0.114) (0.159)
Pre-paidjct -0.081*** -0.081*** -0.098*** -0.065**
(0.024) (0.028) (0.026) (0.027)
Usage-Country-Operator FE yes yes yes yes
Time FE yes yes yes yes
Instrument
MaxCountry MTR 
indexjct
MaxCountry MTR 
indexjct
MaxCountry MTR 
indexjct
MaxCountry MTR 
indexjct
1
st
 Stage Coef. -0.119*** -0.134*** -0.124*** -0.125***
(0.011) (0.009) (0.012) (0.009)
1
st
 Stage R
2
0.162 0.174 0.114 0.222
1
st
 Stage F-test 126.83 205.61 105.85 172.02
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.007]
Observations 4203 4002 4209 3996
Clusters 159 153 165 147
TABLE 5 - THE EFFECT OF MOBILE TRAFFIC ON WATERBED
Notes: The dependent variable is the logarithm of the PPP adjusted total bill paid by consumers with different usage at every quarter. Columns (1) and (2)
utilize information on mobile to total traffic from the Body of European Regulators for Electronic Communications (BEREC), whereas the last two columns
use similar information from the market research company Analysys Mason (see, section 5.1 in the main text for more details). The instrumental variable
MaxCountryMTR is an index that takes larger values the more regulated a mobile operator is compared to the MTR prior to regulation in that country. P-
values for diagnostic tests are in brackets and italics. Standard errors clustered at the country-operator-usage level are reported in parenthesis below
coefficients: *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the Teligen data corresponding to the best deals available at every quarter.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Estimation method IV IV IV IV
Dependent variable lnPujct lnPujct lnPujct lnPujct
Time Period 2002-2006 2002-2011 new treatment group old treatment group
ln(MTR)jct -0.986*** -0.118 -0.031 -0.284**
(0.365) (0.116) (0.207) (0.119)
Pre-paidjct -0.061 -0.094*** -0.083*** -0.080***
(0.047) (0.022) (0.027) (0.024)
Usage-Country-Operator FE yes yes yes yes
Time FE yes yes yes yes
Instrument MaxAll MTR  indexjct MaxAll MTR  indexjct MaxAll MTR  indexjct MaxAll MTR  indexjct
1
st
 Stage Coef. -0.116*** -0.113*** -0.094*** -0.105***
(0.027) (0.013) (0.019) (0.011)
1
st
 Stage R
2
0.072 0.197 0.102 0.140
1
st
 Stage F-test 18.09 80.09 23.43 93.16
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Observations 1749 5283 4197 4008
Clusters 153 195 159 153
TABLE A1 - WATERBED EFFECT THROUGH MTR
SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL
Notes: The dependent variable is the logarithm of the PPP adjusted total bill paid by consumers with different usage at every quarter. The instrumental
variable Regulation is a binary indicator that takes the value one in the quarters when mobile termination rates are regulated. The instrumental variable
MaxAllMTR is an index that takes larger values the more regulated a mobile operator is compared to the highest MTR charged in any country at a given
period. P-values for diagnostic tests are in brackets and italics. Standard errors clustered at the country-operator-usage level are reported in parenthesis
below coefficients: *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the Teligen data corresponding to the best deals available at every quarter.
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(1) (2) (3)
Estimation method IV IV IV
Dependent variable lnEBITDAjct lnEBITDAjct lnEBITDAjct
Time Period 2002-2011 small operators large operators
ln(MTR)jct -0.053 0.088 -0.071
(0.105) (0.320) (0.100)
Country-Operator FE yes yes yes
Time FE yes yes yes
Instrument
MaxCountry MTR 
indexjct
MaxCountry MTR 
indexjct
MaxCountry MTR 
indexjct
1
st
 Stage Coef. -0.140*** -0.190*** -0.129***
(0.017) (0.063) (0.017)
1
st
 Stage R
2
0.264 0.351 0.246
1
st
 Stage F-test 68.13 9.12 56.84
[0.000] [0.009] [0.000]
Observations 2260 358 1902
Clusters 73 16 57
TABLE A2 - WATERBED EFFECT THROUGH MTR (PROFITS)
SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL
Notes: The dependent variable is the logarithm of the EBITDA for each operator in a given country at every quarter. The
instrumental variable MaxCountryMTR is an index that takes larger values the more regulated a mobile operator is compared
to the MTR prior to regulation in that country. P-values for diagnostic tests are in brackets and italics. Standard errors
clustered at the country-operator level are reported in parenthesis below coefficients: *significant at 10%; **significant at
5%; ***significant at 1%.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the BoAML dataset.
